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Abstract:  The insurance futures contracts introduced in December 1992 by the Chicago
Board of Trade offer insurers an alternative to reinsurance as a hedging device for
underwriting risk. These instruments have the usual features of liquidity, anonymity, and
low transactions costs that characterize futures contracts. This paper addresses the issue of
pricing insurance futures contracts in an arbitrage-free framework as the expectation under
the risk-neutral probability measure of the terminal cash flow provided, for instance, by a
long position in a futures contract. Since by definition of the contract the terminal cash flow
is related to the aggregate claims incurred during a calendar quarter, the valuation problem
is of the same type as the one that arises in the pricing of zero-exercise price Asian options.
We propose a solution to this problem using the exact approach developed by Geman and
Yor (1992, 1993).AN ASIAN OPTION APPROACH
TO THE VALUATION OF INSURANCE FUTURES CONTRACTS
By
J. David Cummins and Hé1yette Geman
September 10, 1993
INTRODUCTION
While insurers have a variety of instruments readily available to hedge the risk of assets and
interest-rate sensitive liabilities, until recently reinsurance was the only mechanism for hedging
underwriting risk. Although reinsurance has a number of desirable characteristics, as explained
below, it also has limitations. Reinsurance played a major role in exacerbating the general liability
insurance crisis of 1984-1986 (Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson, 1992), and reinsurance markets are
subject to periodic price and availability cycles. The insurance futures contracts introduced in
December 1992 by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) have a potentially important role to play in
stabilizing insurance markets by providing an alternative hedging mechanism for underwriting risk.
Although the present contracts are limited to property catastrophes, futures covering other types of
losses are likely to be introduced if the catastrophe futures succeed.
Unlike reinsurance, hedging through futures has the advantage of reversibility since any
position may be closed before the maturity of the futures contract if the overall exposure of the
insurer has diminished. Although reinsurance is, in principle, also reversible, in practice reversing a
reinsurance transaction exposes the insurer to relatively high transactions costs as well as additional
charges to protect the reinsurer against adverse selection. Because futures contracts are anonymous
rather than negotiated between two specific parties, the potential for adverse selection and the
accompanying administrative costs are greatly diminished. An insurance futures market should offer
1the advantages of liquidity and low transactions costs that are common to futures contracts.
Unlike most futures contracts traded on the CBOT, insurance futures are based on an
accumulation of insurance loss payments over a period of time rather than the price of a commodity
or asset at the end of a period of time. Consequently, the classical relationships between the spot
price and the futures price do not hold. On the other hand, the fact that the futures price at maturity
will reflect a sum of claim payments entails a structural similarity between this contract and an Asian
option, for which the underlying asset is an average, i.e., a sum of spot prices (up to a multiplicative
constant). Even though the evolution of the state variable underlying the insurance claims process is
likely to be well-approximated by geometric Brownian motion, an average or accumulation of a
lognormal process is not lognormal. Thus, it would be incorrect to price these instruments using
standard futures pricing techniques (e.g., the Black, 1976, model) as suggested by some observers
(CBOT, 1992, Cox and Schwebach, 1992).
The same difficulties arise in the pricing of Asian options and have been mostly addressed in
recent years by using approximations (Kemna and Vorst, 1990, Carverhill and Clewlow, 1990, and
Lévy, 1990). Geman and Yor (1992, 1993) investigate the exact solution of this problem. They are
able to provide, firstly, the moments of all orders of the arithmetic average of a lognormal
distribution and, secondly, a closed form expression for the Asian option price for some values of the
exercise price; for other values of the exercise price they provide the Laplace transform of the Asian
option price. In this paper, we apply the Geman-Yor [G-Y] approach to the valuation of the
insurance catastrophe futures contracts offered by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).
Although the present paper focuses on insurance futures, the methodology is quite general and
could be used to price other types of insurance contracts. Most previous insurance financial pricing
models have modeled insurance in a Black-Scholes framework (e.g., Cummins, 1988). Losses are
modelled as following a geometric Brownian motion process, with loss settlement based on the end-of-period value of the process
1. In reality, however, payoffs under most property-liability insurance
contracts are based on loss accumulations, rather than end-of-period realizations. Thus, such
contracts are related to average-rate (or Asian) options rather than to European or American options.
The paper is organized as follows: In section I, we describe insurance futures contracts and
discuss the merits of these hedging instruments relative to reinsurance. Section II proposes an
arbitrage-free valuation of insurance futures contracts, extending the analysis in G-Y (1992, 1993).
We begin by developing a pricing model for non-catastrophic losses and then extend this model by
introducing a jump process to represent catastrophes. Section III presents some numerical illustrations
of insurance futures prices, using quarterly data on insurance claims and daily pricing data obtained
from the CBOT. Section IV concludes the paper.
I. Insurance Futures
The CBOT introduced insurance futures in December 1992. The initial offerings are limited
to catastrophic property-insurance losses. The two instruments initially introduced cover national and
eastern property catastrophes. The latter are viewed as important because of the exposure to
hurricane losses on the Eastern seaboard. In May 1993, Midwestern catastrophe futures were
introduced, again motivated in part by region-specific windstorm exposure. Property catastrophes are
an important source of underwriting risk, as illustrated by Hurricane Andrew, which led to substantial
losses of equity capital in the industry and several insurance company insolvencies.
2
1A similar approach, also involving the assumption that losses are based on an end-of-period
realization rather than an average is based on the risk-neutral valuation models developed by Brennan
(1979) and Stapleton and Subramanyam (1984). See Doherty and Garven (1986) for an insurance
application of this method.
2Gross losses from Hurricane Andrew were $13.7 billion, of which conventional catastrophe
reinsurance covered only about $3 billion. Snyder (1993). During the same twelve month period,
insurers were also hit by major catastrophe losses from Hurricane Iniki and the Los Angeles riot.
3In addition to the importance of property catastrophes as a risk exposure, another reason for
the CBOT’s focus on property losses is that such losses settle relatively quickly and thus are not
subject to the lengthy payout period and accompanying loss estimation errors that characterize other
risky coverages such as commercial liability insurance and workers’ compensation. Property losses
are relatively insulated from errors due to misstatements and manipulations of loss reserves.
Due to the relatively high loss volatilities characterizing property coverages, insurers should
have a strong interest in hedging underwriting risk arising from property coverages. Nevertheless,
trading in insurance futures has been light. This is most likely attributable to the fact that most insurers
lack experience with financial hedging. The opposite side of the market (sellers of futures) consists
primarily of speculators.
In addition to catastrophe futures, the CBOT is also developing homeowners insurance futures
that would not be limited to catastrophic losses but would cover homeowners property losses from all
sources. Our methodology could also be used to price these contracts.
Catastrophe Futures
A unique characteristic of insurance futures is that there exists no market price, published
index value, or yield rate on which to base settlement values. Accordingly, the CBOT has had to
create an underlying instrument to form the basis for futures trading. For catastrophe futures, the
instrument consists of losses reported each quarter to the Insurance Services Office (ISO), a well-
known statistical agent. Approximately 100 companies report property loss data to the ISO. The
settlement values for insurance futures are based on losses incurred by a pool of at least ten of these
companies selected by the ISO on the basis of size, diversity of business, and quality of reported data.
The list of reporting companies included in the pool for any given futures contract is announced by
the CBOT prior to the beginning of the trading period for that contract. The CBOT also announces
4the premium volume for companies participating in the pool prior to the start of the trading period for
each catastrophe contract. Thus, the premiums in the pool are a known constant throughout the
trading period, and price changes are attributable solely to changes in the market’s expectations of
loss liabilities.
Catastrophe insurance futures trade on a quarterly cycle, with contract months March, June,
September, and December. A contract for any given quarter is based on losses occurring in the prior
calendar quarter as reported by the participating companies at the end of the contract quarter. For
example, the September 1993 contract covers losses from events occurring during the second quarter
of 1993 (April through June) as reported by the end of September. The three additional months
following the close of the “event quarter, ” are to allow for loss settlement and data processing lags
that are common in insurance. Although not all losses will be reported by the end of the two quarter
reporting period, reported pool losses should represent a high proportion of eventual paid losses,
particularly in view of the fact that companies are allowed to report estimated losses in addition to
those already paid.
3 Of course, the use of estimated rather than paid losses introduces potential errors
into the contract settlement values and may create incentives for moral hazard (see below).
Unlike most insurance and reinsurance arrangements, insurance futures do not focus on a
particular type of policy (such as homeowners or automobile insurance) but rather on particular types
of losses. Losses included in the pool consist of all property losses incurred by the reporting
companies arising from the perils of windstorm, hail, earthquake, riot, and flood. Reported losses
can arise from eight different lines of insurance including homeowners, commercial multiple peril,
earthquake, and automobile physical damage.
4 Even though the contracts are called catastrophe
3In insurance terminology, the pool is based on incurred (paid plus estimated unpaid) losses rather
than solely on paid losses.
4Other lines of insurance included in the pool are fire, allied lines, farmowners, and commercial
inland marine (see CBOT, 1992).
5futures, in fact all losses (i.e., not just catastrophe losses) for the specified perils and lines of business
are included in the loss pool. However, the losses in the pool are expected to be highly correlated
with property catastrophe losses because the included perils were chosen as those most susceptible to
catastrophes. The use of a proxy approach rather than true catastrophe losses seems to have been
motivated by the need to limit data processing costs. Trading begins as soon as a contract is listed
and ends on the fifth day of the fourth month following the contract month. Thus, settlement on the
September 1993 futures takes place on January 5, 1994.
Contract settlement is based on the loss ratio of the business reported to the ISO pool, i.e.,
the ratio of reported incurred losses to earned premiums.
5 The contracts trade in units of $25,000
with prices quoted in percentage points and tenths of points. E.g., a price of 11.2 corresponds to a
loss ratio of 11.2 percent and an expected settlement value of $25,000*. 112 = $2,800. The average
trading prices during March 1993 were 10.2 for the March 1993 contract, 9.2 for the June 1993
contract, 17.1 for the September 1993 contract, and 25.4 for the December 1993 contract. These




of reported losses to the specified perils proxying for catastrophes.
a maximum loss ratio of 200 percent.
because of the
Contract settlement is
more precise statement of the final settlement value for a contract is provided below:
(1)
where F(T) = futures price at maturity, L(T) = losses incurred during the six month payment period,
and II = premiums earned during the three month exposure (loss event) period. Thus, the
5Premiums earned is an accrual accounting measure indicating the premiums attributable to
coverage provided during a specified period of time. For example, if a policy is issued on January 1
and has an annual premium of $1,200, $300 of the premium will be earned during the first quarter of
the year. Using premiums earned as the denominator thus matches revenues against coverage
provided (as measured by loss events).
6settlement value is trading unit ($25,000) times the loss ratio (L(T)/II), capped at an amount equal to
twice the trading unit (i. e., a loss ratio of 2.0). This is equivalent to a long position in the loss ratio
plus a short position in a call option on the loss ratio with a strike price of 2.0. The latter
relationship is used below in pricing the futures contract. The CBOT placed a maximum on the
settlement value both to reduce credit risk in the event of unusually large losses and to make the
contract look more like reinsurance policies, which usually have upper limits (see below).
The insurer’s net gain from a long position in a futures contract is the settlement price minus
the price at the inception date of the contract. The price of the futures contract at any given time
reflects the market’s expectation of the event quarter’s catastrophic loss in relation to the earned
premiums for that quarter.
To illustrate some of the unique aspects of insurance futures, consider a simple hedging
example. Assume that an insurer anticipates $5 million in earned premiums on policies subject to
catastrophes during the first quarter of the year. The insurer forecasts catastrophic losses of $600,000
for this quarter, i.e., a catastrophic loss ratio of 0.12. The firm wants to hedge against catastrophic
losses greater than $600,000 by purchasing June futures contracts. Assume that the CBOT announces
that the total premium volume for companies included in the June catastrophe insurance pool is $3
billion. The company’s actuaries predict that the ISO companies will incur catastrophic losses of
$345 million during the event quarter (the fourth quarter of the preceding year) for an expected loss
ratio of 11.5 percent and that 80 percent of these losses will be reported by the end of March. The
insurance futures price at the beginning of the trading period, F(0), will reflect the market’s
expectations regarding the loss ratio of the homeowners pool. If the expectations of the company’s
actuaries are shared by the market, the price of an insurance futures contract is equal to:
$25,000 *.115*.8 = $2,300.
To simplify the example, we assume that the expectations of the hedging company and the
7market are identical. We also assume that the company’s catastrophic loss ratio is perfectly correlated
with the loss ratio of the pool. Under these assumptions, the insurer can fully hedge its catastrophe
risk by taking a long position in insurance futures contracts. The number of contracts is determined
by the following formula:
(2)
where Ni = number of contracts purchased by company i,
h i = proportion of its anticipated catastrophe losses firm i desires to hedge,
P i = premium volume of firm i,
Ri = expected proportion of pool losses reported to ISO by end of reporting period,
V = insurance futures contract value.
Assume that the futures contracts are held to expiration and both the pool’s
loss ratio are 5 percentage points higher than expected. At maturity, the gain on
and the insurer’s
a long position in
the futures contracts will be 250*[F(T)-F(0)] = 250*25,000*0.05*0.8 = $250,000, where T = the
expiration date. The gain on the futures contracts obviously equals 5 percent of the insurer’s earned
premiums and makes up for the extra losses encountered. Of course, if the loss ratio of the pool is
lower than expected, the insurer incurs a loss from the long position.
6 If the insurer’s and pool’s loss
ratio movements are not perfectly correlated, the hedge provided by the futures contract will not be
perfect.
7
6However the insurer’s initial expected loss ratio would still be achieved under the assumption of
perfect correlation between the insurer’s and the pool’s loss ratios because the loss on the futures
position would be offset by lower losses on the insurer’s book of business.
7If the insurer only wants to protect against higher than anticipated loss ratios but wants to benefit
from lower than expected ratios, it can buy futures call options (also offered by the CBOT) rather
than futures. As with other futures call options, there is a cash settlement at the maturity of the
option if the option is exercised.
8We summarize this discussion by listing some of the unique and unusual characteristics of
insurance futures:
1. There is no market price for insurance losses. The CBOT has created an index based on
losses reported by a sample of insurers.
2. The loss ratio of the pool is not perfectly correlated with any given insurer’s catastrophe
loss ratio. Thus, a hedge created with insurance catastrophe futures will not be perfect.
3. Because the pool is based on all losses for certain types of perils and policies especially
vulnerable to catastrophes, the pool loss ratio is actually a catastrophe proxy and thus is
not perfectly correlated with the true catastrophe loss ratio of insurers reporting to the
pool .
4. Because insurers report incurred rather than paid losses to the pool, the contract
settlement value is subject to loss estimation error.
5. For regulatory reasons, insurers are unlikely to take short positions in futures contracts.
Thus, the supply side of the market is represented almost exclusively by speculators.
Futures and Reinsurance
As mentioned above, insurance futures are very similar to certain types of reinsurance contracts
that are widely used in the property-liability insurance industry. Reinsurance, which is insurance
among insurance companies, provides a way for insurers to efficiently diversify risk. The market for
reinsurance is international, reflecting the economic principle that it is efficient to subdivide risks as
finely as possible, subject to limitations imposed by transactions costs (e.g., Samuelson, 1963).
Transactions costs traditionally have been low in reinsurance markets, facilitating diversification
during normal periods. However, within the past two decades, reinsurance markets have sustained
severe loss shocks (e.g., oil tanker disasters and rising liability losses in the U. S.) as well as
increasing problems with asymmetric information caused by high-risk, low-price market entrants,
many of which failed during the mid-1980s. As a result, reinsurance markets have experienced
severe price fluctuations and availability problems. This creates a potentially important role for
futures markets, which may be less affected by some of these problems than reinsurance markets.
9The types of reinsurance most comparable to the insurance futures are known as non-
proportional contracts. Such contracts have a mathematical structure similar to options and other
types of financial-market derivative securities.
8 A general specification, fitting most types of non-
proportional reinsurance, is the following:
(3)
losses incurred by the primary insurer, M = the primary insurer’s retention (or reinsurance point of
attachment), and R = the upper limit of the reinsurance contract, R > M. The reinsurance contract
has the effect of a deductible of M, i.e., the primary insurer bears the losses if they are less than M
but is limited to a loss of M if losses are between M and R. If losses exceed R, the difference
between L and R also must be borne by the primary insurer. It is not uncommon for the primary
insurer to buy a reinsurance contract from another reinsurer that attaches at L = R and has an upper
limit > R.
Although the mathematical structure of reinsurance is similar to that of financial contingent
claims, there are important differences between reinsurance and financial claims. While the parties to
a futures contract are anonymous to one another, reinsurance is negotiated between the parties to the
contract. The negotiation process rather than an auction market determines the price of reinsurance.
Although the primary company may negotiate with several reinsurers before making a decision, the
buyer of reinsurance is less assured of receiving an informationally efficient, arbitrage-free price than
the buyer of actively traded futures and options. Reinsurance prices and contract terms are specific to
8The other major type of reinsurance is proportional reinsurance. This type of reinsurance
involves the proportionate division of premiums and losses between the primary insurer and the
reinsurer according to a pre-arranged constant proportion between 0 and 1. Proportional contracts do
not have the same mathematical structure as the CBOT’s futures offerings.
10the buyer of the contract, unlike financial claims which are standardized to all buyers and sellers.
Thus, reinsurance can be tailored to the specific needs of the buyer, but transactions costs are likely
to be higher than in futures markets. Due to the buyer specific nature of reinsurance, it is usually not
possible to close out a position in the reinsurance market by taking an opposite position, as it is in
futures markets. Thus, futures markets provide better liquidity than reinsurance.
The reinsurer underwrites the buyer, in the sense of investigating the quality of the buyer’s book
of business and management, to prevent adverse selection. Contractual terms such as cost-sharing
provisions are often used to reduce moral hazard. Other than guarding against manipulation of the
pool by participating insurers, the costs of adverse selection and moral hazard are minimal in futures
markets. Credit risk also is of minimal importance in futures markets, because of the daily margin
adjustment, the existence of the clearing house, and daily trading limits.
9 On the other hand, buyers
of reinsurance need to be concerned about the solvency of their reinsurers. If the reinsurer defaults,
the primary insurer is still fully liable to its policyholders for reinsured policies.
An advantage of reinsurance over futures is that reinsurance covers the primary insurer’s own
loss experience, whereas futures are based on a policy pool that is not perfectly correlated with the
hedger’s losses. In addition, reinsurers often provide “real” services to primary companies such as
advice and assistance in underwriting, primary market pricing and contract design, and loss settlement
(Mayers and Smith, 1990). Such services obviously are not available in futures markets. Thus,
reinsurance and futures are similar but are not perfect substitutes; there is likely to be a continuing
role for both types of contracts in hedging underwriting risk.
9Daily trading limits are ten points ($2,500). If the daily limit goes into effect for two days in a
row, the limit is raised to 15 points ($3,750). The higher limit stays in effect until the first day that
prices move by less than 10 points, at which time the initial ten point limit is reinstated.
11II. The Valuation of Insurance Futures Contracts
The objective of this section is to develop pricing models for insurance futures. We begin with
a brief discussion of the traditional actuarial model for pricing property-liability insurance, explaining
why this model is not appropriate for futures pricing. We then develop futures pricing models using
the approach of Geman and Yor (1992, 1993) for two cases: (1) Futures on insurance contracts
subject to non-catastrophic claims accumulations, and (2) catastrophe insurance futures.
The Traditional Insurance Pricing Model
Actuaries traditionally have valued insurance claim accumulations such as those underlying
catastrophe insurance futures as random sums (see, for example, Panjer and Willmot, 1992):
where C = total claims accumulation over
n = the number of claims, and
Xi = the amount of loss for claim i.
(4)
some period of time,
The number of claims (n) is a random variable modeled by a discrete probability distribution such as
the Poisson or negative binomial, while the claim amounts (also random) usually are modeled by a
continuous distribution such as the gamma distribution. The Xi are
identically distributed and independent of the claim number process
of C is:
assumed to be independent and
(n). The probability distribution
where p(k) = a discrete probability distribution such as the Poisson,
 = the kth convolution of the probability distribution of claims severity.
12The price of insurance based on this model is typically equal to the expected value plus an
additive function of the second moment of the distribution (e.g., a constant times the variance or
standard deviation). This pricing approach is inconsistent with the value-additivity principle which
prevails in financial markets, as has been observed by some leading actuaries (e.g., Buhlmann, 1980).
In contrast, our pricing approach is based on the avoidance of arbitrage opportunities
10 and on the
modeling of the instantaneous claim process as a geometric Brownian motion (with a jump component
in a second stage). Since aggregating claims is equivalent, up to a scale factor, to averaging claims,
the approach we propose in the following sections is based on the exact Asian option pricing
methodology developed by Geman and Yor (1992 and 1993). As explained above, the use of an
averaging approach differentiates our models from previous insurance financial pricing models, which
value losses as end-of-period realizations.
General Assumptions
This section discusses the general assumptions applicable to both the non-catastrophe and
catastrophe insurance futures models. The general assumptions are as follows:
A0. The premium volume of the pool is known with certainty. Hence, randomness of the
pool’s experience is entirely attributable to losses.
Al. There is no adverse selection or moral hazard. Adverse selection is precluded because the
pool of contracts is constituted before the futures contracts begin trading. Moral hazard, e.g.,
manipulation of pool loss experience by company’s contributing data to the pool, which seems to be a
potential problem, is also unlikely, for the following reasons:
(a) Assume that an insurer participating in the pool takes a long position in the futures
10Although our contingent claim (the insurance futures contract) cannot be duplicated with traded
instruments; this is also true of other options and futures written on non-traded underlying assets such
as various types of economic indices, where arbitrage free valuation seems quite reasonable.
13market and overstates the amount of claims on its share of the pool. Since the pool experience is
based on property losses, which settle quickly, it should be relatively easy to detect systematic claim
overstatements through periodic audits of pool members.
(b) Assume that the insurer takes a short position in the futures market and understates or
delays the reporting of claims incurred prior to the expiration of the futures contract. The extra gain
on the futures contract would be offset by the loss of the hedge on the unreported claims. Even
though this situation is technically more feasible than that discussed in case (a), it is unlikely on the
part of insurers, who are naturally hedgers rather than speculators.
A2. There are no transactions costs, i.e., the insurer incurs no fees in taking either a short or
long position in a futures contract.
A3. Futures contracts are infinitely divisible; any fraction can be bought or sold.
A4. Default risk is non-existent due to the clearing house, daily marking to market, and trading
limits.
A5. Insurers participating in the pool report loss experience continuously, and the pool’s loss
experience at any given time is known to all market participants.
A6. There is no arbitrage in the sense defined by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and
neutral” probability measure Q equivalent to P under which the price of any security (expressed in the
money market accumulation factor as numéraire) is a martingale. Moreover, financial markets are
complete, i.e., any contingent claim has a unique price, which verifies the same martingale property.
Futures Pricing for Non-Catastrophic Loss Processes
In addition to the general assumptions specified above, our futures pricing model for non-
14catastrophic loss processes is based on the following additional assumption:
A7. The amount of claims S(t) incurred on the policies in the pool at any time t belonging to
the listing period [0,T] of the futures contract is a diffusion process driven by the stochastic
differential equation:
respectively, the expected growth and instantaneous standard deviation of the claims process. Even
though S(t) does not represent the value of a traded asset, we assume (as in Shimko, 1992) that
risk-adjusted drift of the claim level (sometimes called the risk-adjusted growth rate). Consequently,
under Q, the process S(t) is driven by:
(7)
It is clear that standard option pricing formulas cannot be used to value insurance futures
contracts, contrary to some discussions in the actuarial literature (e.g., Sherman, 1991). This is
precluded for two reasons: (1) The settlement value is an average of a Brownian process rather than
an end-of-period value, and (2) there is no premium to pay to take a position in a futures process, but
at the same time there is significant downside risk, which is never the case with an option. However,
a European call option and a futures contract share a major common feature: they are both contingent
claims which give the right to a random cash flow at a well-defined time T, and consequently, their
pricing should be addressed with the same methodology.
However, the price of a futures contract does not exactly satisfy the property in assumption 7
15(A7) since it is not the price of an asset (e.g., opening a long position in a futures contract requires a
null investment). But the price of a futures contract is equal to the expectation under the risk-neutral
probability Q of its settlement value (see Jamshidian, 1989, Geman, 1989). Consequently, at any
time t
To obtain the futures price, it is necessary to evaluate the two quantities:
We can observe that






This averaging process is exactly the one whose value at time T is compared to the strike price to
define the payoff of an Asian option. As discussed earlier, there is no reason to believe that this
process is a geometric Brownian motion, and the calculation of V(t) is not straightforward. However,
Asian option with maturity T and exercise price zero.
At this point it may be useful to recall some properties and results regarding Asian options that
16have been derived in recent years. Asian options have become extremely popular, especially on
thinly traded assets such as gold and some other commodities. Comparing at maturity the strike price
with an average of spot prices over a time interval prevents price manipulations on maturity day by
institutions with significant shares of the market for the underlying asset. A high proportion of
currency options and most options on oil traded today are Asian options. However, the pricing of
such instruments is not straightforward since, with the standard assumption of a geometric Brownian
motion for the asset price dynamics, the distribution of the average is unknown and has no reason to
be of the same type. That is why Asian option pricing has been addressed primarily through
approximations, e.g.,
and Vorst, 1990) and
1990). However, prices calculated using these numerical procedures are subject to unknown errors of
approximation. Other authors (e.g., Lévy, 1990) have suggested approximating the distribution of the
average by a lognormal distribution. This leads naturally to a Black-Scholes type formula, but this
formula is not an accurate reflection of the revelation of the average over time.
Consider an asset S(t) whose dynamics are driven, under the risk-neutral probability measure
Q, by the stochastic differential equation (7). This process is averaged on the interval [0,T] through
formula (12). Assuming constant interest rates on the interval [O, T], G-Y (1993) establish that the
price at time t of the Asian option with maturity T and exercise price k, i.e.,
the approximation of the arithmetic average by the geometric average (Kemna
numerical procedures using fast Fourier transforms (Carverhill and Clewlow,
(13)
can be written in the following form:
17where
(14)
Since G-Y assume that interest rates are constant, we can immediately derive from equation
(14) that
Equation (15) is what we need to value an insurance futures contract.
has a very simple expression when q is negative since it only involves




the first-order moment of
constant, the value of a zero-exercise price Asian option, we derive from (14),
Formula (17) clearly shows that claims already incurred over the interval [0,t]
random amount to
time t of this total
the total amount that will be observed at time T, and hence
amount, which is exactly V(t).
(16)
is, up to a multiplicative
(15), and (16) that
(17)
contribute a non-
to the expected value at
18When q is positive, G-Y need to use Bessel processes to calculate C
(v)(h,q). They do not
provide a closed-form expression for this quantity but only its Laplace transform with respect to the
variable h:
As we did for V(t), we can write Y(t) using equation (15), as
(18)
(19)
than 2II and the quantity ql will be positive. This necessitates the evaluation of the Laplace transform to
obtain C
(v)(h,ql). In the rare cases where ql is negative, we obtain C
(v)(h,ql) directly from equation (16).
The value of the futures contract F(t) at any time t is obtained by inserting V(t) and Y(t) into
equation (8): F(t) = ($25,000/II)[V(t)-Y(t)]. Our valuation of F(t) does not require deterministic interest
rates since formula (8) holds even when interest rates are stochastic, i.e., the assumption of constant
interest rates in G-Y (1993) is not needed in the use we make of their results.
The Case of Catastrophe Insurance Futures Contracts
To deal with the valuation of catastrophe insurance futures, we retain assumptions Al to A6 but
change assumption A7 to A7´ in order to incorporate a jump component into the pure diffusion process
19we previously had used to represent the amount of claims S(t) incurred for the policies in the pool:
A7´. The amount of claims S(t) incurred at any time t in the listing period [0, T] is driven by the
following stochastic differential equation:
(20)
where k = a positive constant representing the severity of the loss jump component due to catastrophes,
and
We can observe at this point
assumption; since we do not
means that we assume that a
completeness.
that the addition of an extra source of randomness makes A6 a stronger
believe that the risk of the jump component can be diversified away, this
contingent claim related to this risk is traded, which preserves the market’s
has the general solution:
where
where
the process Z(t) needs to be specified. Using Ito’s rule in equation (22), we obtain:
( ) denotes the bracket (see, for instance,
The equality between the two expressions
relationship:
Protter, 1990).





Equation (24) now reduces to:







We now consider the aggregate claim amount at time T:
21where u < s < T. The last integral can also be written as:
(30)
(31)
For the sake of simplicity, we first compute the expectation under Q of the quantity TA(T) at time




In order to get simple closed-form expressions, we now need to assume that the Poisson process H
is independent of exp[X(s)-X(u)]. Assuming the independence of the two components of the claim
process seems quite reasonable and allows us to write
(34)
22which reduces to
We now turn to the general situation where the current time t is in the interval [0,T] and where we
and
where t < s < T and 0 < v < s. This last expectation is in turn the sum of three terms that we denote













the observed claims forward value of the claim process (see Geman, 1989) but appears implicitly in both
and S(t). We can also observe that, satisfactorily, this expectation is separately increasing in the first
term (the accumulated claims up to time t), in S(t) (the current level of the claim process), and in k and
Modeling Loss Reporting Lags
Before turning to the examination of market prices and the estimation of the parameters in our
model, we must describe another feature of the CBOT insurance futures contract that we have not
mentioned before for the sake of readability. The aggregate losses L(T) that are reflected in the
settlement value F(T) of the futures contract are losses reported over the two-quarter time period [0, T]
arising from catastrophes that occurred during the first quarter of the life of the contract, [0, T/2]. To
reflect this feature, we believe that the best representation of the instantaneous claim process over the
time interval [0, T] consists of the juxtaposition of two stochastic processes. The first one, valid in the
time interval [0, T/2], has the jump component described in equation (20),
(43)
where S(0) = a given positive constant. The second process, valid in the second sub-period [T/2, T] is a
pure diffusion process which has the same random term as the continuous part of (43) but a possibly
24different drift a´,
(44)
where S(T/2) is given by equation (43). Severe catastrophes during the period [0, T/2] would be
reflected in a high value of S(T/2) derived from equation (43), while there is no rationale for new jumps
already incurred in the period [0, T/2] are on average reported over the time interval [T/2, T].
To support our point, we can observe that the volatility of the market prices of the March 1993
futures contract was much lower during the month of January 1993 than during the month of December
1992 and extremely low in absolute terms during the month of March 1993. The same property holds
for the market prices of the June 1993 contract during the months of May and June (see section III).
Coming back to the pricing formulas of the futures contract over the time interval [0, T], we now
need to distinguish two periods.
section II provide for the futures price V(t):
(45)
where the first term accounts for the claims reported and known up to time t and the second term
accounts for the expectation of the claims to be reported during the period [t, T].
The first term V1(t) is provided by formula (42), where T is replaced by T/2, everything else being
unchanged.
25where S(T/2) itself is given by formula (29), which gives
(47)
(48)





This section provides an empirical analysis of catastrophe insurance futures. We begin by
26providing some summary information on catastrophic property losses and then turn to a discussion of the
CBOT insurance futures. The section concludes with a discussion of parameter estimation.
Property Catastrophes
Property catastrophes represent a significant risk for property owners and insurers. The insurance
industry defines a catastrophe as “an event which causes in excess of $5 million in insured property
damage and affects a significant number of insureds and insurers” (Property Claims Services, 1993). As
the definition implies, catastrophes represent a problem because they involve large losses and, even more
fundamentally, constitute a violation of the most basic principle of insurance - the independence and
diversifiability of risk. In principle, of course, very few events have world-wide consequences, so
catastrophe losses should be diversifiable internationally through the reinsurance market. In practice, the
demand for reinsurance often exceeds the supply because of information asymmetries, parameter
estimation uncertainty, and the large concentration of property values in disaster prone areas such as the
Eastern seaboard and Gulf coast in the United States. Futures markets thus have a potentially important
role to play in hedging catastrophe risk.
During the period 1970 through mid-1993, an average of 34 catastrophes occurred each year,
causing an annual average of $2.5 billion in losses. Figure 1 shows catastrophe losses by quarter since
1980. As the figure suggests, most catastrophes are relatively small, e.g., less than $250 million.
However, the potential for much larger catastrophes clearly exists. For example, Hurricane Andrew
caused twice as much damage ($10.7 billion) as the next largest catastrophe (period since 1949)
Hurricane Hugo ($4.2 billion). Hurricane Iniki, the fourth largest catastrophe since 1949, also occurred
during the second quarter of 1992, accounting for the extremely high losses during this period.
The lines of insurance subject to property catastrophes (the lines included in determining the
settlement value of the CBOT’S futures contract) account for about 40 percent of total property-liability
insurance premium volume. Property catastrophes thus represent a significant threat to insurers.
Hurricane Andrew alone, for example, caused insured losses totalling about 20 percent of 1992 premium
27volume in the affected lines of insurance. The possibility that losses of this magnitude can occur in the
future provides insurers with a powerful incentive to hedge catastrophic risk.
Figure 2 provides more detail on the magnitude and volatility of catastrophe losses by quarter.
The figure shows the average and standard deviation of catastrophe loss ratios for the period 1970 to
1993. During the first quarter of the year, property catastrophes average about 1.5 percent of total
premiums, compared to a typical overall loss ratio for these lines of between 60 and 70 percent. Fourth
quarter losses also are relatively small, averaging about 2 percent of premiums. Both the average loss
and loss volatility are considerably higher during the second and third calendar quarters, when most
windstorm, flood, and hurricane losses occur. Second quarter losses average about 4.3 percent of
premiums, while third quarter losses amount to 6.2 percent. (Eliminating Hurricane Andrew, third
quarter losses average about 3.5 percent of premiums.) It should be noted that these loss ratios are
lower than the loss ratios for CBOT futures contracts because the futures cover all losses arising from the
set of perils usually associated with catastrophes rather than being limited solely to catastrophic losses.
The CBOT Futures Contracts
In spite of the importance of catastrophic risks to insurers, the CBOT futures contracts have been
very thinly traded, as shown by the price/volume chart for the March 1993 contracts (Figure 3). Recall
that these contracts cover loss events during the fourth quarter of 1992 that are reported to insurers by
the end of March 1993. The contracts began trading on December 11, 1992 at 8 percent and closed on
July 6, 1993 at a loss ratio of 8 percent after trading between 10 and 11 percent for most of the trading
period. Trading in more recent contracts also has been light.
As discussed above, because no market price exists for insurance losses, the CBOT has created an
index based on losses reported to a statistical agent (the Insurance Services Office). This index is as
legitimate as other economic indices to be the underlying value of a futures contract as long as it is
highly correlated with individual insurers’ loss experience and there is no asymmetry of information
28between buyers and sellers of the contract. Studies of insurance losses have shown that loss ratios are
highly correlated across the insurance industry (e.g., Cummins and Nye, 1980), and one would expect
catastrophic losses to have a stronger systematic component than losses in general. Furthermore, the
CBOT releases “demographic reports” on the distribution of premiums by state that will be included in
calculating the loss ratio underlying the futures contracts, and regional as well as national contracts are
offered. This information should permit individual insurers to easily determine whether the synthetic
loss ratio parallels their own loss exposure and to adjust their hedging strategies accordingly. Thus, a
lack of representativeness is not the most likely explanation for the thin trading in the CBOT’s present
futures contracts.
Information problems are the most likely explanation for the light trading in the CBOT’s insurance
futures contracts. Traders can observe daily prices or yields on the commodities or instruments
underlying other futures contracts. In contrast, very little information on the catastrophe insurance
futures contract loss ratios is available prior to settlement except of course for the companies that belong
to the pool. For the March 1993 contracts, data relating to the underlying loss ratio were released on
only one day, April 4, more than three months after the end of the event quarter. The April 4 release
consisted of an interim loss ratio “evaluated as of December 1992. ” No additional information on the
loss ratio was available until the contract settled on July 6. As explained below, the lack of more
frequent data on the synthetic price significantly impedes parameter estimation and thus makes it very
difficult for traders to form expectations. This additional source of uncertainty limits the hedging value
of the contracts.
The reason given by CBOT officials for the limited release of loss ratio data is the time required
by the ISO for recording and processing loss data. However, considering the power of modern
computers and data base programs, it is very difficult to believe that a system could not be designed with
the capability of releasing daily data. It is likewise difficult to believe that the ISO needs three months
following the end of the reporting period to record and audit the loss reports. It is unlikely that
29insurance futures contracts will succeed unless these information problems are solved.
Parameter Estimation
To discuss parameter estimation, we begin with the simplest case, i.e., the futures contract with no
jumps or reporting lags (see equation (17)). The parameters we need to estimate are those present in
equations (6), (7), and (17):
=       the expected growth of the claims process, S(t),
= instantaneous standard deviation of the claims process,
claims risk, and
S(0) = the starting value of the claims process.
In order to estimate the parameters, time series of loss ratios and futures prices are required. Currently,
the sequence of loss ratios is not observed and the sequence of prices, while observed, is based on a
small number of transactions. Thus, we discuss parameter estimation procedures and provide
illustrations, but the estimation of parameters with sufficient precision for use in trading must await the
availability of more complete data.
Recall that S(t) is a geometric Brownian motion process and that the observed loss ratios, L(t)/II,
are based on accumulations of this process (see equations (7) and (1l)). G-Y (1992) provide formulas
for the moments of accumulations based on geometric Brownian processes. Thus, if we could observe
the sequence of loss ratios, we could estimate the empirical moments of L(t)/II and solve for the
11 The first two moments of L(t) are: parameters using a method of moments procedure.




Given a sequence of loss ratio observations for contracts of the same calendar quarter at the same point
in time (e.g., time 0) as well as an estimate of S(t), one could
of the loss ratio, set them equal to (52) and (53), respectively,
Given a sequence of price and loss ratio data along with
calculate the first two empirical moments
by minimizing the sum of squares of the difference between the left and right hand sides of (17).
The foregoing discussion assumes that an estimate of S(t) is available. However, because the
claims process itself is not observed, an estimation procedure must be specified to obtain S(t). The
derivative of the loss ratio is:
Equation (54) could be used along with observations on the loss ratio to provide estimates of S(t).
reinforces the need for daily observations on the loss index. Equation (54) also provides an approximate
(54)
31expression for the rate of change of the loss ratio, based on the expected value of geometric Brownian
expected loss ratio derivative on the left hand side of this equation, it could be solved simultaneously
We use the incomplete data that are presently available to illustrate the estimation of these
parameters. The March 1993 national catastrophe futures contracts are used as an example. The initial
quarter of a year), we estimate S(0)/II as 0.0567*4 = 0.2268.
12 The first and second moments of the
loss ratio were then estimated based on the catastrophe loss data provided in Property Claims Service
(1993). The loss data were grouped by quarters and the estimation period was 1970-1993. The first
moment was adjusted upward to recognize the fact that the CBOT contracts cover all losses from policies
likely to be subject to catastrophes rather than just catastrophic losses. The initial estimate of the March
1993 contract’s loss ratio (0.0567) was used as the mean. The estimate of the second moment of the loss
ratio about the origin was .005. However, it proved impossible to obtain convergence for the three
equation system with such a low second moment estimate. Since second moments are likely to suffer
from higher estimation error than first moments, this is perhaps not surprising. To complete the
illustration, we increased the second moment until convergence was attained. This occurred at a value of
0.1428, and 0.22, respectively. Since S(t) is not observed, it is difficult to determine whether these
estimates are reasonable. However, simulations of geometric Brownian motion processes using these
parameters yielded loss ratio averages and time paths that do not seem unrealistic.
The reader is cautioned that the parameter estimates are very sensitive to the input parameters.
However, it is likely that accurate parameter estimates could be obtained with more adequate data on the
32synthetic loss ratio. Daily reports on the ISO loss accumulation would probably be sufficient. Even
reports on the loss accumulation released after the close of the contract period would be a major
improvement over the current system.
To estimate the parameters of the jump component of the model, we use a methodology similar to
that developed in D’Arcy and France (1992). They point out that catastrophe losses have both an
expected or “normal” and an unexpected or unusual component. The expected component is estimated
by fitting a trend line to the quarterly catastrophe loss ratio data series provided in Property Claims
Services (1993). An exponential trend line is estimated by regressing the natural log of the loss ratio on
a linear time variable. The trend line for fourth quarter catastrophes based on the sample period 1970-
1992 is given below (t-ratios are given in parentheses):
The actual and fitted values of the trend line are shown in Figure 4. Catastrophic losses above the trend
line are considered jumps. Eleven jumps occurred over the twenty-three year sample period, yielding an
estimated frequency parameter for the Poisson jump process of 0.47. Jump severity is estimated as the
average of the exponential of the residuals of the trend line. Thus, positive jumps are partially offset by
negative jumps in measuring jump severity. This is appropriate to avoid overestimating jump loss
severity. Only positive jumps are considered in estimating frequency to avoid overestimating frequency.
The average jump severity is estimated as 1.36, implying that the occurrence of a jump results in
catastrophe losses 36 percent above the anticipated “normal” catastrophes.
the quarter following the event quarter. Given adequate data on futures prices and the underlying loss
33III. CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops an Asian options model for insurance futures pricing. The Asian approach is
appropriate because most insurance contracts, including the CBOT catastrophe insurance futures, have
payoffs defined in terms of claims accumulations rather than the end-of-period values of the underlying
state variables. In our model, the state variable is assumed to be a geometric Brownian motion -- the
claims process. The payoff on the insurance futures contract is determined by the accumulation or
integral of the state variable.
The model is illustrated in terms of the CBOT catastrophe insurance futures. The payoff on the
CBOT futures is determined by the ratio of property insurance losses to premiums (the loss ratio) for
lines of insurance most likely to be affected by property catastrophes. Because there is no market price
for insurance losses, the CBOT created an index based on losses reported to a statistical agent by a
sample of insurers. The contracts cover loss events occurring during a specified calendar quarter (the
event quarter) that are reported by the end of the calendar quarter following the event quarter.
Catastrophic losses are modelled as consisting of a geometric Brownian motion component plus a
jump component. The Brownian motion component represents losses arising from “expected” or
“normal” catastrophes, while the jump component represents unusually large catastrophes that occur less
frequently. The model allows for separate Brownian drift parameters for the event quarter and the
reporting quarter following the event quarter. The jump component, which applies only during the event
quarter, is modelled using a Poisson process.
Property catastrophes represent a significant risk to property owners and the insurance industry.
Reinsurance, the conventional hedging mechanism for insurance claims, does not provide a perfect hedge
for insurers because of illiquidity and periodic capacity shortages in the reinsurance market. Thus,
insurance futures have significant potential as a hedging device for insurers. However, insurers have not
yet shown much interest in the CBOT catastrophe futures.
Insurer reluctance to trade insurance futures is due in part to the conservatism of the insurance
34industry and most insurers’ lack of experience with derivative financial instruments. Another potential
explanation is that the synthetic loss process is not perfectly correlated with the losses of individual
insurers. However, there is a significant systematic component to insurance losses, especially those
involving catastrophes. Therefore, insurers should be able to reduce risk by trading futures contracts.
We believe that the primary reason for the limited trading of insurance futures is the lack of
information on the loss index. While traders in commodities and financial futures can observe the
underlying prices or yields at least daily, information on the loss ratio underlying the insurance futures
settlement price is released only once prior to the settlement date. The release occurs after the conclusion
of the six-month reporting period. Thus, there is very little information to support parameter estimation
or to assist traders in forming expectations. Although insurance futures are a promising approach to
hedging insurance risk, the CBOT’s current offerings are unlikely to be successful unless the information
problem is solved.
Topics for future research include the implementation of our parameter estimation methodology
using more complete data and the extension of our model to include stochastic jump severity. The
investigation of futures options and the option-like cap on the current futures contracts would also be
useful. These problems can be solved currently using Monte-Carlo simulation, but the development of a
closed form solution would be of both theoretical and practical interest. Finally, because most insurance
settlements are determined by loss accumulations, our model could be applied to the pricing of other
types of insurance contracts.
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